A disruption in the sense of agency is the primary phenomenological feature of response to hypnotic suggestions but its cognitive basis remains elusive. Here we tested the proposal that distorted volition during response to suggestions arises from poor metacognition pertaining to the sources of one's control. Highly suggestible and control participants completed a motor task in which performance was reduced through surreptitious manipulations of cursor lag and stimuli speed. Highly suggestible participants did not differ from controls in performance or metacognition of performance, but their sense of agency was less sensitive to cursor lag manipulations, suggesting reduced awareness that their control was being manipulated. These results indicate that highly suggestible individuals have aberrant metacognition of agency and may be a valuable population for studying distortions in the sense of agency.
Introduction
The primary phenomenological feature of a response to a hypnotic suggestion is the perception that one is not the author of one's actions or experience (Oakley & Halligan, 2013) . This disruption of one's sense of agency is reliably observed in highly suggestible (HS) individuals, who comprise 10-15% of the population (Woody & Barnier, 2008) . The magnitude of these disruptions closely parallels those of patients with schizophrenia (Polito, Langdon, & Barnier, 2015) , indicating that HS individuals may be valuable in identifying the neurocognitive bases of distortions in the sense of agency (Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz, & Lynn, in press).
The mechanisms underlying response to suggestion and distorted volition among HS individuals are poorly understood but multiple theories converge on the hypothesis that distorted sense of agency during hypnotic responding arises from a disruption of meta-awareness. Different models have proposed that hypnotic responding is driven by cognitive control that is experienced as extra-volition because of a disruption of executive monitoring (Dienes & Perner, 2007; Hilgard, 1977; Kunzendorf, 1985-86; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960 ) (see also Kirsch & Lynn, 1998; Spanos, 1986) . One theory has specifically hypothesized that responses to suggestion are facilitated by a disruption of metaawareness of intentions pertaining to one's responses (Dienes & Perner, 2007) .
Multiple lines of evidence offer support for an involvement of aberrant metacognition in high hypnotic suggestibility. Hypnotic suggestibility is negatively associated with mindfulness and meditators display reduced or average hypnotic suggestibility (Semmens-Wheeler & Dienes, 2012; Spanos, Steggles, RadtkeBodorik, & Rivers, 1979) . Meditators seem to have greater awareness of motor intentions (Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann, & Schmidt, 2015) whereas HS individuals seem to have delayed awareness of such intentions (Lush, Naish, & Dienes, 2016) . Reducing metaawareness may also enhance suggestibility (Brown, Antonova, Langley, & Oakley, 2001 ). Finally, HS individuals display reduced prefrontal activity or prefrontal functional connectivity either at baseline or following a hypnotic induction (Jamieson & Burgess, 2014; McGeown, Mazzoni, Venneri, & Kirsch, 2009; Terhune, Cardeña, & Lindgren, 2011) , including in medial prefrontal regions that have been implicated in metacognition of agency (Miele, Wager, Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011) . Nevertheless, the prediction that metacognition pertaining to one's sense of agency is diminished in HS individuals has not yet been directly tested.
In this study we tested the prediction that high hypnotic suggestibility is characterized by reduced metacognition of agency. HS participants and controls completed a motor control task in which performance was disrupted through surreptitious manipulations related (cursor lag), and unrelated (stimuli speed), to motor control (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Metcalfe, Van Snellenberg, DeRosse, Balsam, & Malhotra, 2012 
